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Note, we are not claiming that all preferences are stable, or that context is irrelevant in predicting individual decisions. In our data, choices are neither identical nor perfectly correlated across contexts, indicating that context also plays a role in these decisions. Indeed, many preferences (including social preferences) often require information about the context in order to be expressed as actions. For example, if an individual has a preference for reciprocity, then his actions will vary depending on the actions of his counterpart (the context). Similarly, if an individual prefers to choose the second-largest piece of cake, her particular choice will vary based on the choice set provided (Sen, 1993) . Understanding how preferences are affected by elements of the relevant contexts is critical to telling us when we can use actions in one domain to predict actions in another, and when we cannot.
Understanding the stability of preferences across multiple domains also has important policy implications. Stability would indicate that when we measure preferences in one domain, that the resulting insights can be applied to different but related areas. It would also support the use of appropriately designed experiments to test-bed economic policies (e.g. Plott, 1994) . This debate over preference stability is by no means new. Stigler and Becker (1977) lay out the argument for stable preferences, the notion that tastes do not "change capriciously" (p. 76). The constructed preference viewpoint is nicely summarized by Plott (2001) : "The construction [of preferences] depends upon the mode in which a response is called. Task and context are thought to influence the construction and, as a result, preferences are thought to be labile if, indeed, they can be said to exist at all" (p. 227; see also Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006) .
The recent work of Levitt and List (2007a) finds evidence of context-specificity. Reviewing prior literature, they conclude that "the context that actors themselves brought to the game and that the experimenters cannot control-like past experiences and internalized social norms-proved centrally important in the outcome of play" (p. 163).
An intermediate case is proposed by Hoeffler and Ariely (1999) and Plott's (2001) discovered preferences. In Hoeffler and Ariely (1999) , individuals construct preferences when they are faced with a new type of decision, and then these preferences stabilize over time. In Plott (2001) preferences are stable but unknown to the individual and are "discovered" through repetition and learning.
The stability of social preferences across decision environments has been explored in several prior studies. Karlan (2005) shows stability in trustworthiness across contexts: behaviors in laboratory trust games are good predictors of loan default in Peru. Benz and Meier (2008) show stability in charitable behavior across contexts: donations in a modified dictator game (where the recipient is a charity rather than a person, see e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 1996) significantly predict donations to the University's social funds. Carpenter and Seki (2006) show that cooperative preferences, measured with a public goods game, relate to labor productivity among Japanese fisherman. Laury and Taylor (2008) find mixed evidence for stability of cooperative preferences between lab provision of public goods and one particular charitable organization: Trees Atlanta, which plants shade trees in urban areas. Social preferences are exhibited by subjects in a lab setting but not in a market setting in List (2006) . 1 1 In addition to the stability of social preferences, studies have focused on the stability of time and risk preferences. For example, Ashraf et al (2006) find that individuals who are hyperbolic discounters have a higher demand for savings commitment devices, and Meier and Sprenger (2007) show that individuals who are present-biased have higher credit card balances. Eckel et al (2005) compare short-term (2-28 days) and long-term (7 years) investment decisions using a population of low-income Canadians and find that, while short term elicited discount rates are higher in magnitude than their long-term counterparts, the short-term decisions reliably predict the long term decisions. Additional studies include: Eckel et al (2007) , Slovic (1964) , MacCrimmon and Wehring (1985) , Andersen et al (2008), and Dave et al. (2008) .
Our study makes several contributions to the study of preference stability. First, our study targets a new, policy relevant sample -low-income African Americans -rather than the traditional convenience sample of undergraduates. We compare revealed preferences for cooperation in the lab across several different decision contexts, rather than just one context. Finally, we collect data on activities outside the lab, enabling us to compare lab-based decisions with related self-reported behavior.
Generally our results support the stability of social preferences. Preferences for contributing to a public good are relatively stable and robust across decision environments. We also support reciprocity or inequality-aversion motivations for giving in a new and unique sample; low-income African American subjects. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss our experimental design and implementation. In Section 3 we discuss the results from each task independently, and sections 4 and 5 present the relationships between them. Section 6 concludes.
Experimental Design and Implementation
Experimental sessions were run in June, 2007 in the Fair Park neighborhood of Dallas, Texas. Our results are based on 190 participants who were recruited via flyers at their homes and in local stores. The flyers described key aspects of the experiment, and included a phone number to call to register. Participants called the number, registered for a session, and arrived at our site.
Upon arrival, subjects were asked to read and sign a consent form and were paid the show-up fee. Participants worked through an activity booklet containing a number of incentivized tasks: a risk-preference elicitation (Eckel and Grossman, 2002, 2008) ; a timepreference elicitation (similar to Eckel, Johnson and Montmarquette, 2005) ; a laboratory public goods game (VCM); and three versions of a donation game which were developed for this study.
In half of the sessions participants completed a short survey eliciting their connection to the community before completing the VCM and donation experiments; in the other half the survey is administered post-experiment.
2
The decision tasks and resulting forms and instructions were explicitly designed for a low-literacy population, with the games presented in pictorial form with minimal text. The experimenter followed a pre-tested script to explain each task, and answered questions before each one. At the end of the session, one of the tasks was randomly chosen for payment, as was fully explained to the participants.
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Once the activity booklet was completed, subjects were given a five-minute snack break.
When the participants returned, they completed a social network activity and a detailed postexperimental survey designed to collect information on demographics, identity, housing, financial sophistication, and financial donations to non-profits as well as volunteer work. This paper focuses on the results from and relationship between the linear VCM, the donation experiments, and self-reported donations/volunteering.
In the VCM, participants were randomly assigned into anonymous groups of three and given an endowment of $60 which they could allocate either to an individual or a group account.
In order to simplify the game, participants were given four discrete options. They could choose to: (1) keep all $60, (2) keep $40 and donate $20, (3) keep $20 and donate $40, or (4) donate all $60. Since clarity was of utmost importance for this subject pool, in the experiment we described 2 There are no significant differences in mean or distribution for the VCM or any of the charities, so the data is pooled for this analysis: VCM (t: p=0.46; k-s: p=1.00), Health (t: p=0.51; k-s: p=0.43), Child Education (t: p=0.16; k-s: p=0.32), Job Training (t: p=0.26; k-s: p=0.09). 3 Full instruments and instructions are available online at http:\\cbees.utdallas.edu projects.php#nhs. The choice of one task for payment (sometimes called the random lottery incentive mechanism) is to avoid portfolio effects and has been validated in a variety of studies (see e.g. Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden, 1998; Lee 2005a, 2005b) . One of the particular advantages of this mechanism for our sample is that we are able to increase the payoffs for each decision, making the incentive of the games particularly salient. individuals deciding how much they wanted to "put in their wallet" and how much they wanted to "put in the group account," rather than the more abstract "allocate" language often used in instructions with undergraduate students. This was done to minimize confusion among the subjects and had the added advantage of creating parallelism between this and the donation experiments, described below. Money in the individual account (the wallet) was kept by the individual. Money in the group account was doubled, and then divided equally among the three members of the group, regardless of their decisions (MPCR = .66).
We intentionally excluded the option to give half of the endowment. First, we wanted to move people away from the focal 50/50 split to ensure variability in the data, and second, since we displayed everything in a visual manner, this design choice enabled us to depict all of the choices pictorially using $20 bills.
In the donation experiments participants were arranged into different groups of three and again faced with a decision involving the allocation of $60 -three $20 bills. In this game, however, money placed in the group account was not doubled and distributed to the participants but instead doubled and donated to an organization that provides a public good for the neighborhood. We conducted three donation experiments, one for each of the following: The Martin Luther King, Jr. Family Clinic (health services), The Dallas Bethlehem Center (educational services for children), and The Inner-City Community Development Corporation (job training services). wages (27 hours). Thus we believe that the stakes were large enough to ensure that participants thought carefully about the problems. Average earnings were $79 ($108 if you include payments to the charities), with a minimum of $20 (the show-up fee) and a maximum of $280.
Subject Pool and Descriptive Results
In this section, we describe our sample and descriptive results from each of our measures independently: VCM, Donations experiments, and self-reported donations of time and/or money.
Sections 4 and 5 describe the relationship between them and thus provide our test of stability of preferences.
Most previous experimental research on cooperation has focused on a convenience sample of university undergraduates (see e.g. the papers reviewed in Ledyard, 1995) or samples from other countries (see e.g. Carpenter et al, 2004; Henrich et al, 2001 Henrich et al, , 2004 . We begin by extending the experimental literature with a new, policy-relevant population sample; participants from a low-income, predominantly African-American neighborhood.
The sample and neighborhood characteristics are described in Table 1 . These participants are very different from the typical student sample; they are older, tend to have children, and to be the main wage-earner in their homes. The sample is almost completely African American, with low levels of income and other financial assets.
[ Table 1 : Description of the Sample about here]
Figure 1, below, shows the distribution of contributions to the group account for the VCM and Donations experiments. We see a substantial level of cooperation in the VCM. Note that the mean contribution is 41.1% of the endowment, which is within the normal contributions range for prior studies of 40 to 60% (Ledyard, 1995) , giving us confidence that our protocol was reasonable, and suggesting that our results are comparable to other samples.
[Insert Figure 1 : Amount sent to the group account, VCM and Donations Experiments]
For the Donations Experiments, we see a reduction in donations to the group account as compared to the VCM. 6 However, this shift is not as strong as might be expected given the differences in the MPCR (0.66 for the VCM, and approximately 0.00 for the charities). We see that individuals contribute on average 30.4% of their endowment to the Health charity, 31.1% to the Children's Education charity and 27.2% to the Job Training organization.
Since the Donations experiment protocol has not been tested with other populations, we cannot directly compare behavior among individuals in this population to other studies. The closest studies are the modified dictator experiments where the recipient is a charity. The first study to do this was Eckel and Grossman (1996) ; in their study individuals gave on average 30.1% of their $10 endowment. This is very similar to behavior in our sample, although we have 6 We fully blocked the order of the real charities. a larger endowment and a doubling of donations. In a previous study of giving to hurricane-relief organizations, Eckel, Grossman, and Milano (2007) include a treatment with a $50 endowment and a 100% match (doubling of donations). They find that student subjects send on average 46.7% of their endowment -substantially more than our sample.
There is a significantly higher proportion of individuals choosing to contribute zero in the Donations Experiments than to the VCM (using a one-tail test: Health, p=0.033; Childcare, p=0.026; Job Training, p=0.002). While average contributions are lower in the donations experiments, there are no significant differences in giving among the charitable organizations.
We further find no differences in contributions for any of the donations experiments for gender, home ownership, employment status (unemployed in the last year, temporary work, part-time, full-time), highest education achieved, age, marital status, number of children, or the number of years an individual has lived in the neighborhood. We also find no differences in the mean contribution to the charities by whether or not the individuals needed assistance with written materials, or the number of people they recognize, know by name, or consider friends in the session.
7
In sum, we see a significant amount of cooperative behavior in this low-income population. There is less cooperation in the Donations experiments than in the VCM, but it is still substantially greater than zero. Further, the observed level of cooperation does not vary with demographic characteristics.
Examining self-reported charitable activity, 72.6% of our subjects donate time or money to charitable causes. We find no gender differences in these contributions, but home owners (ttest, p=0.002), those employed full-time in a permanent job (t-test, p=0.04) and those who have at least some college are more likely to contribute (t-test, p=.02). These variables may proxy for income (we have no direct measure of income). We find no differences by age, number of children, or years lived in the neighborhood. Demographics seem to have a more substantial role in the self-reported charitable contributions than in the Donations experiments. Particularly, people who are more stable and attached to the community (home owners, permanently employed, better educated) are more likely to report that they contribute time and/or money to charitable causes in their everyday lives.
Stability of Preferences: Donations Experiments
We now turn to an examination of the relationship between the choices made in the VCM, a revealed social-preference for cooperation, and choices made in the Donations experiments. We treat behavior in the VCM as an explanatory variable, with Donations as the dependent variable. Recall that the two tasks are presented in a similar manner to the subjects. In both cases they are in groups of three, and contributions are doubled by the experimenter. The difference is that the multiplied contributions to the group account go to a charity instead of being divided among the group members. 8 If a preference for contributing to public goods as measured by the VCM is a good predictor of donations to local public goods, then we should see large and statistically significant coefficients in these regressions.
In addition to cooperative or social preferences (as measured by VCM behavior), we know that other factors may affect the decision to contribute to charitable organizations. For example, we hypothesize that preferences for risk and time will also be related to the decision to contribute. For example, contributions to local public goods may be viewed as an investment in the community. Individuals could use the money today, but if they contribute to the public good it will help them (and other people in the neighborhood) in the future. If this is the case, then patient people will be more willing to contribute, and should contribute more on average, to the public good. This logic has been confirmed for the case of common pool resources by Fehr and Leibbrandt (2008) . However, this probability that this investment in the public good will translate into future services is not one; that is, a particular individual might never use the organizations' services. If this is the case, then investment in the public good is a risky decision (paying now for something which may not generate any benefit) and individuals who are more risk averse will be less willing to contribute (and will contribute less) to the public goods. We will thus include our measures of risk and time preference as covariates in our analysis. This is similar to Eckel et al. (2007) , who found that risk tolerance and patience were positively related to an individual's own human capital investment.
In addition to preferences for risk and time, it is reasonable to assume that factors that increase an individual's value for the public good (such as needing a job or having children) will increase the amount that they are willing to contribute to the public good. Previous studies of volunteerism often find this type of demographic variation in the willingness and amount of contributions to charitable causes (see e.g. Freeman, 1997) . These measures are also be included as covariates.
Other factors that could impact the amount and willingness to contribute to the charitable causes are how much individuals think the neighborhood needs an increase in that local public good and how much they trust that type of organization. These measures are also included as controls in our analysis. (2007), or because of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) . On the other hand, if individuals are purely selfish, the coefficient on beliefs should be zero, while if individuals are altruistic (Becker, 1974) , the coefficient should be negative.
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In addition to collecting information about how much participants expect others to give to the organizations, we also collected information on their perceptions of other individuals in their neighborhood using modified World Values Survey questions for the fairness, helpfulness, and trustworthiness of their neighbors. If subjects care only about the level of the public good, then these factors will not impact provision. Further, even if people only care about how much others will give, then these perceptions will not matter. 10 Only if the participants place some value on the deservingness of the recipients of their donations will perceptions impact provision, controlling for beliefs. Since donations provide local, neighborhood-level public goods, we expect that when the subjects perceive that individuals in their neighborhood are more fair, helpful, and trustworthy that they will donate more to the local public goods.
We thus describe the donation decision as:
9 Replicating previous research, we find that individuals are, on average, optimistic about others' donations (e.g. 
Recall that subjects have the choice of donating $0, $20, $40, or $60. Since the choices of donations are discrete, we estimate f using an ordered probit regression. In Table 2 , we present results from two different approaches to the analysis. First, we estimate three equations, one for each organization, using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). Second, we estimate a single equation, pooling all three decisions. For the SUR, we jointly estimate three ordered probit equations in order to generate robust standard errors, and cluster around the individual, since each individual is making three decisions. For the pooled model we present the results of a random effects ordered probit. The interpretation of these models differs slightly. For the seemingly unrelated model, the correlation between the decisions is interpreted as coming from the similarity of the decisions, whereas for the random effects model, the correlation is coming from the fact that the same person is making the three decisions.
We provide full descriptions of all of the variables, along with their descriptive statistics, in Appendix Table 1 . Table 2 provides a comparison of results across the three local public goods organizations as well as the pooled model. We include as controls demographics, 11 the perception of the need for the service that the organization provides in the neighborhood, trust in providers of this type of service, proxies for valuation of the service, and location in our target area. The estimates of these controls are omitted for sake of brevity, but are available upon 11 Including gender, education, age, employed, number of children in the household, and frequent church attendance.
request from the authors. They are rarely (if ever) significant in the analysis and dropping them does not alter the results.
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[Insert In all three of the individual regressions, as well as the pooled data, the VCM choice is positively and significantly related to donations behavior, revealing the stability of cooperative preferences in these domains. This is true even controlling for individual beliefs about how much others will contribute to the organizations.
As predicted, individuals who are more risk averse contribute less to all of the public goods, though the result is not as strong for the job training organization. Further, individuals who are more patient contribute more to the organization in all cases. This extends the result in Fehr and Leibbrandt (2008) to the case of public goods, and is similar to Eckel et al. (2007) , who find that risk tolerance and patience are positively related to an individual's own human capital investment. We argue that subjects view donations to these organizations as an investment in their neighborhood -and subjects who are less risk averse and more patient are more willing to invest.
As expected, beliefs about the laboratory contributions of others are positively and significantly related to behavior. Further, we see that individuals contribute more to the local charities when they perceive their neighbors as being more fair.
A second way to address the issue of the stability of cooperative preferences across contexts is to look at the number of organizations to which a subject donates (0 to 3) as a function of VCM giving. Table 3 provides two specifications of this model. Model 1 uses the ordinal VCM data, just as in the previous specification. Model 2 uses a dummy variable equal to one if the subject made a positive contribution to the VCM's group account. We see that in both cases, the contribution to the VCM group account is positively and highly significantly related to the number of organizations to which a subject donates, providing further confirmation of the stability of social preferences. People who contribute more to the VCM not only donate more to the local public goods, but they also donate to more organizations.
[Insert Once again, we see that beliefs and patience are positively related to the contribution decision, whereas here risk aversion is not statistically significant. In addition, we see that individuals who view others in their neighborhood as being fair contribute more frequently.
Stability of Preferences: Self-Reported Local Public Good Provision
In this analysis, we examine the correlation between contributions to the VCM and selfreported provision of public goods -the decision to contribute money and/or time to charitable causes outside of the laboratory environment. The relationship between the VCM and the decision to contribute outside of the lab provides a further test of the stability of cooperative preferences.
In our survey, subjects self-report the number of organizations to which they donate either money or time. Specifically, we ask subjects to list, by name, each of these organizations.
We then create a variable equal to one if the subject donates time and/or money to charitable causes, combining the decision to donate time and/or money. 13 We argue that some people who would donate money may volunteer their time instead if they have particularly low income, and 13 Freeman (1997) finds a strong positive relationship between charitable giving and volunteer work while Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) show the impacts of price and income on volunteerism.
thus either type of activity is a signal of cooperative preferences. In addition, individuals frequently contribute both time and money. Since our interest is in cooperative behavior in general, we pool these self-reported activities. We include the same controls as above for sociodemographic characteristics. We estimate a probit model of the decision to donate time and/or money, reported in Table 4 , below.
[Insert We also see that the perceptions of individuals in the neighborhood are related to donations behavior, but in a more complex manner than we previously observed. As predicted and previously observed, if the individual perceives their neighbors as fair and/or trustworthy, the likelihood of contributing increases. However, contrary to our initial hypothesis, individuals who view others in their neighborhood as being helpful are less likely to contribute.
We note that the impacts of perceptions of one's neighbors on self-reported cooperative activities are stronger than the impacts on donations to the local organizations. Recall that for the Donations experiments we have direct information regarding the individuals' beliefs about others' contributions. We believe that the impact is stronger in the former case because these perceptions are providing information to individuals about the deservingness of their neighbors, as well as information regarding the likelihood they will contribute.
Conclusion
We find that preferences for contributing to public goods are strongly related across decision contexts. Our measure of cooperative preferences from the lab setting (VCM) significantly predicts the amount that individuals are willing to contribute to local charities in Donations experiments, the number of charities they contribute to, and whether they report contributing time and/or money to local charitable causes in their day-to-day lives. Taken together, this evidence lends support to the argument that preferences for contributing to public goods are stable across decision contexts.
However, context clearly plays an important role in these decisions as well. Although behavior in the VCM predicts these other decisions, it does not perfectly explain the data. Beliefs about others' giving and perceptions of neighbors are also important factors in the decision to contribute. Thus we have direct evidence that these features of the context affect the decision.
Although we have good explanatory power for cross-sectional data, there is still substantial variation that we are not able to explain, leaving room for other factors, such as unmeasured context, to affect decisions.
Our results support the idea that preferences are stable, but also context-dependent. For example, individuals may have a stable but context-specific preference (e.g. to 'do the right thing'). Even though the preference is stable, observed behavior may vary by context (measured and unmeasured) because an individual's perception of the 'right thing' would change. This suggests that preferences may appear to be either constructed or discovered as individuals learn the contextual details.
Overall, however, our results provide support for the generalizability of preferences across at least a limited domain. This is good news for policymakers, who can elicit preferences in one domain and remain confident that they will at least partially predict preferences in another. More theoretically, our data also sheds light upon (but does not resolve) the theoretical and philosophical debate about the stability of preferences.
A great deal of work, by a great number of well-respected researchers, has attempted to unify data, concepts and contributions from economics, psychology, sociology and other related fields. By focusing on what our theories of preference stability have in common, rather than their differences, we can move economics, as well as the remainder of the social sciences, forward toward a consistent, realistic, and tractable model of human decision making. 
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